Meditations, Book 5
Marcus Aurelius · Greek original · new English translation and commentary by Text Atlas
Overview
Book 5 repeatedly joins independence of judgment to social action, testing that relation through fatigue, failure, obstruction, and other people’s losses.
The dawn dialogue culminates in social action, giving its summons a more specific end than activity for its own sake. Rest is conceded; crafts, greed, and vanity supply comparisons of intensity rather than one approved aim. The benefactors in 5.6 test a related distinction: service can become an inward account against its recipient even without a spoken demand. Their vine analogy is defended against the objection that cooperation needs awareness. What must disappear is the claim to additional credit, not the intelligence of social action. The whole frames acceptance and models coordination. Chapter 8 joins causes as stones fit a structure, then shifts from individual health to cosmic health. Chapter 30 orders through subordination, coordination, and distribution according to worth. These hierarchical images promise neither uniform rank nor personal relief from each harsh event. They also leave work to do: personal and common nature share a road in 5.3, while 5.25 distinguishes present allotment from the response required of the agent. Inner independence becomes clearest where qualified. In 5.20 the obstructing person remains owed aid and patience; reservation redirects a disposition without guaranteeing the intended result. In 5.26 sensation reaches thought naturally, while the added moral verdict is restricted. This helps interpret the more absolute denial of external influence in 5.19. In 5.36 assistance with an indifferent loss is required without adopting its recipient’s valuation. Ethical independence remains compatible with practical concern. Practice includes return. Chapter 5 refuses to let limited quickness excuse misconduct but still requires training. Chapter 9 approaches philosophy after failure through relief and affection. The departure passages also vary: 5.10 waits for dissolution, 5.29 frames its severe conditional with present social living, and 5.33 retains duties while waiting under alternative accounts of death. The retrospective examination in 5.31 and past assertion of fortune in 5.36 ask how conduct can make life sufficient, without dating the entries or turning every memory into a universal present claim. These connections support a reading across the book, not a continuous treatise. Arguments, objections, lists, prayers, and fragments address different failures of attention. Historical categories and severe bodily language remain part of their pressure. The deleted negative in 5.12, the bodily-bounds reading in 5.33, and the broken rostra transition in 5.36 limit smooth synthesis: a recurring social demand coexists with local formulations that resist one unqualified rule.
5.1
Ὄρθρου, ὅταν δυσόκνως ἐξεγείρῃ, πρόχειρον ἔστω ὅτι ἐπὶ ἀνθρώπου ἔργον ἐγείρομαι· τί οὖν δυσκολαίνω, εἰ πορεύομαι ἐπὶ τὸ ποιεῖν ὧν ἕνεκεν γέγονα καὶ ὧν χάριν προῆγμαι εἰς τὸν κόσμον; ἢ ἐπὶ τοῦτο κατεσκεύασμαι, ἵνα κατακείμενος ἐν στρωματίοις ἐμαυτὸν θάλπω; ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἥδιον. πρὸς τὸ ἥδεσθαι οὖν γέγονας, ὅλως δὲ σὺ πρὸς πεῖσιν ἢ πρὸς ἐνέργειαν; οὐ βλέπεις τὰ φυτάρια, τὰ στρουθάρια, τοὺς μύρμηκας, τοὺς ἀράχνας, τὰς μελίσσας τὸ ἴδιον ποιούσας, τὸ καθ’ αὑτὰς συγκροτούσας κόσμον; ἔπειτα σὺ οὐ θέλεις τὰ ἀνθρωπικὰ ποιεῖν; οὐ τρέχεις ἐπὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν σὴν φύσιν;
ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ ἀναπαύεσθαι. φημὶ κἀγώ· ἔδωκε μέντοι καὶ τούτου μέτρα ἡ φύσις [ἔδωκε μέντοι] καὶ τοῦ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν καὶ ὅμως σὺ ὑπὲρ τὰ μέτρα, ὑπὲρ τὰ ἀρκοῦντα προχωρεῖς, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πράξεσιν οὐκέτι, ἀλλ’ ἐντὸς τοῦ δυνατοῦ. οὐ γὰρ φιλεῖς σεαυτόν, ἐπεί τοι καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἄν σου καὶ τὸ βούλημα ταύτης ἐφίλεις.
ἀλλ’ οἵ γε τὰς τέχνας ἑαυτῶν φιλοῦντες συγκατατήκονται τοῖς κατ’ αὐτὰς ἔργοις ἄλουτοι καὶ ἄσιτοι· σὺ τὴν φύσιν τὴν σαυτοῦ ἔλασσον τιμᾷς ἢ ὁ τορευτὴς τὴν τορευτικὴν ἢ ὁ ὀρχηστὴς τὴν ὀρχηστικὴν ἢ ὁ φιλάργυρος τὸ ἀργύριον ἢ ὁ κενόδοξος τὸ δοξάριον; καὶ οὗτοι, ὅταν προσπαθῶσιν, οὔτε φαγεῖν οὔτε κοιμηθῆναι θέλουσι μᾶλλον ἢ ταῦτα συναύξειν, πρὸς ἃ διαφέρονται· σοὶ δὲ αἱ κοινωνικαὶ πράξεις εὐτελέστεραι φαίνονται καὶ ἥσσονος σπουδῆς ἄξιαι;
At dawn, when you are reluctant to get up, have this thought ready: I am getting up to do a human being’s work. Why, then, am I resentful if I am going to do what I was born for, what I was brought into the cosmos for? Or was I made to lie under blankets and keep myself warm? But this is more pleasant. Were you born for pleasure, then? In general, were you born to be acted upon or to act? Do you not see the little plants, the little birds, the ants, the spiders, the bees doing their own work, each helping to put the cosmos in order? And then you refuse to do a human being’s work? You do not hurry to do what accords with your own nature?
But one must rest too. I agree. Yet nature has set limits to this [yet has set], and to eating and drinking as well. Still, you go beyond those limits, beyond what is enough. In action, however, you do not: you fall short of what you can do. You do not love yourself. Otherwise you would love your nature too, and what it wills.
People who love their crafts wear themselves down at their work, without washing or eating. Do you honor your own nature less than the engraver honors engraving, the dancer dancing, the miser money, or the vain man his little reputation? When these people are passionately attached, they would rather increase what they care about than eat or sleep. Do social actions seem cheaper to you, worth less serious effort?
Commentary
The argument for getting up identifies human work with social action while conceding that rest has a natural measure. The resistance of a warm bed gives the entry its immediate setting. The first reply asks what kind of creature is getting up: plants and animals contribute their particular activity to an ordered world, and a human being has work of his own. The objection about rest is expressly granted. The charge is an asymmetry between exceeding what suffices for comfort and withholding what one can give to action. The final examples shift from the small creatures to people absorbed in an occupation or desire. Crafts, greed, and vanity share intensity of attachment without sharing an approved end. The concluding question names the end that has been undervalued: social actions. Read through that conclusion, the opening summons concerns participation in human life, not a demand to maximize every form of labor.
5.1.2, 5.1.3 The examples of people neglecting food and sleep measure attachment; they do not cancel the preceding concession to rest. The imagined objection receives an affirmative reply before nature is said to set limits. The later craft-lover, miser, and seeker of reputation demonstrate what people endure for something they prize. Their presence in one list makes admiration of every object of desire unlikely. The argument tries to expose a mismatch between professed self-love and commitment to social conduct. It gives no schedule for sleep or criterion by which another person’s need for rest could be measured.
5.2
Ὡς εὔκολον ἀπώσασθαι καὶ ἀπαλεῖψαι πᾶσαν φαντασίαν [τὴν] ὀχληρὰν ἢ ἀνοίκειον καὶ εὐθὺς ἐν πάσῃ γαλήνῃ εἶναι.
How easy it is to push away and wipe out every impression—[the] troubling or alien one—and immediately be in complete calm.
Commentary
The compressed exclamation presents calm as the immediate result of dismissing an intrusive impression. Two forceful verbs picture the impression as something that can be pushed away and wiped out. The adjectives then specify what is disturbing or alien to the mind’s proper business. The passage is unusually confident about the ease and speed of the change. Its brevity does not explain how to distinguish an unhelpful impression from information that requires action. Elsewhere in this book the treatment of sensation and assistance supplies useful limits: bodily perception may reach thought, and a loss can call for help even when it should not be judged an evil. Those distinctions help explain the practical target of this maxim without weakening its deliberately sweeping voice.
5.3
Ἄξιον ἑαυτὸν κρῖνε παντὸς λόγου καὶ ἔργου τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ μή σε περισπάτω ἡ ἐπακολουθοῦσά τινων μέμψις ἢ λόγος, ἀλλά, εἰ καλὸν πεπρᾶχθαι ἢ εἰρῆσθαι, μὴ σεαυτὸν ἀπαξίου. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ ἴδιον ἡγεμονικὸν ἔχουσι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὁρμῇ χρῶνται· ἃ σὺ μὴ περιβλέπου, ἀλλ’ εὐθεῖαν πέραινε ἀκολουθῶν τῇ φύσει τῇ ἰδίᾳ καὶ τῇ κοινῇ, μία δὲ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων [ἡ] ὁδός.
Judge yourself worthy of every word and deed according to nature. Do not let the blame or talk that follows from some people distract you. If it is noble to do or say something, do not count yourself unworthy of it. Those people have their own ruling faculty and act on their own impulse. Do not keep looking around at these things. Go straight ahead, following your own nature and the common nature; [the] road of both is one.
Commentary
Self-worth is measured by a natural deed’s quality, while other people remain responsible for their own impulses. The command to count oneself worthy follows a standard: a word or deed must accord with nature and be noble. It is therefore not simple confidence in whatever one already wants. Blame and talk can distract the agent from that standard because they have their source in other ruling faculties. The closing image brings personal and common nature onto one road. This prevents the distinction between one’s own impulse and another person’s from becoming a claim that an individual’s preference is sufficient. The point is to maintain the course already tested by natural and common purposes, without surrendering its direction to subsequent commentary.
5.4
Πορεύομαι διὰ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν, μέχρι πεσὼν ἀναπαύσομαι ἐναποπνεύσας μὲν τούτῳ, ἐξ οὖ καθ’ ἡμέραν ἀναπνέω, πεσὼν δὲ ἐπὶ τούτῳ, ἐξ οὗ καὶ τὸ σπερμάτιον ὁ πατήρ μου συνέλεξε καὶ τὸ αἱμάτιον ἡ μήτηρ καὶ τὸ γαλάκτιον ἡ τροφός· ἐξ οὗ καθ’ ἡμέραν τοσούτοις ἔτεσι βόσκομαι καὶ ἀρδεύομαι· ὃ φέρει με πατοῦντα καὶ εἰς τοσαῦτα ἀποχρώμενον αὐτῷ.
I travel through what accords with nature until I fall and rest, breathing my last into that from which I draw breath each day, falling upon that from which my father gathered his little seed, my mother her little blood, and my nurse her little milk; that from which I have been fed and watered every day for so many years; that which bears me as I tread upon it and use it for so many things.
Commentary
The imagined final fall gathers the body’s present dependencies into a return to what has sustained it. The speaker is still traveling through natural events when he anticipates rest. Breath returns to its daily source; the falling body returns to what furnished the substances of generation, nursing, and continued nourishment. Father, mother, and nurse retain distinct contributions. The final relative clause changes the emphasis from receiving sustenance to treading on and using the sustaining ground. The body’s future dissolution is thus approached through relations already operating in ordinary life. Air and earth are intelligible referents for the repeated demonstratives, but the wording emphasizes what each provides rather than offering a named recipient or a developed account of an afterlife.
5.5
Δριμύτητά σου οὐκ ἔχουσι θαυμάσαι· ἔστω, ἀλλὰ ἕτερα πολλά, ἐφ’ ὧν οὐκ ἔχεις εἰπεῖν· οὐ γὰρ πέφυκα. ἐκεῖνα οὖν παρέχου, ἅπερ ὅλα ἐστὶν ἐπὶ σοί, τὸ ἀκίβδηλον, τὸ σεμνόν, τὸ φερέπονον, τὸ ἀφιλήδονον, τὸ ἀμεμψίμοιρον, τὸ ὀλιγοδεές, τὸ εὐμενές, τὸ ἐλεύθερον, τὸ ἀπέρισσον, τὸ ἀφλύαρον, τὸ μεγαλεῖον. οὐκ αἰσθάνῃ πόσα ἤδη παρέχεσθαι δυνάμενος, ἐφ’ ὧν οὐδεμία ἀφυίας καὶ ἀνεπιτηδειότητος πρόφασις, ὅμως ἔτι κάτω μένεις ἑκών; ἢ καὶ γογγύζειν καὶ γλισχρεύεσθαι καὶ κολακεύειν καὶ τὸ σωμάτιον καταιτιᾶσθαι καὶ ἀρεσκεύεσθαι καὶ περπερεύεσθαι καὶ τοσαῦτα ῥιπτάζεσθαι τῇ ψυχῇ διὰ τὸ ἀφυῶς κατεσκευάσθαι ἀναγκάζῃ; οὐ μὰ τοὺς θεούς, ἀλλὰ τούτων μὲν πάλαι ἀπηλλάχθαι ἐδύνασο, μόνον δέ, εἰ ἄρα, ὡς βραδύτερος καὶ δυσπαρακολουθητότερος καταγινώσκεσθαι. καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ἀσκητέον μὴ παρενθυμουμένῳ μηδὲ ἐμφιληδονοῦντι τῇ νωθείᾳ.
People cannot admire your sharpness. Granted. But there are many other things about which you cannot say, “I was not born for that.” Show those, then, which are wholly up to you: sincerity, dignity, endurance, indifference to pleasure, freedom from complaint, few needs, goodwill, freedom, simplicity, restraint in speech, greatness of character. Do you not see how much you could already show, with no excuse of lacking natural gifts or aptitude, yet still you willingly remain below? Are you forced by your poor natural equipment to grumble, be stingy, flatter, blame your little body, try to please, show off, and toss your soul about in so many ways? No, by the gods. You could have been free of all this long ago, and have been blamed, if at all, only for being somewhat slow and having difficulty following things. But even this must be trained, without neglecting it or taking pleasure in your dullness.
Commentary
Lack of exceptional quickness is denied the power to excuse failures of character, but intellectual effort remains required. The opening concession removes one disputed advantage from the argument: others may indeed find nothing remarkable in the speaker’s sharpness. A long list then names qualities he can exhibit without that advantage, including endurance, sincerity, few needs, goodwill, and restraint in speech. A second list asks whether weak natural equipment compels the faults that oppose them. The answer is severe because the alleged limitation has been made to carry more explanatory weight than it can bear. Yet the ending does not make dullness a virtue. Even the remaining slowness must be trained, without neglect or complacency. The distinction is between an excuse for misconduct and a limitation that still calls for practice.
5.5.1 The closing adjective can describe difficulty understanding rather than difficulty being understood. LSJ gives both the ordinary passive sense and an active sense, citing this passage for the latter. In combination with the charge of slowness and the final reference to dullness, the active reading makes the speaker’s own grasp of things the issue. It does not establish whether the supposed deficiency is real: the opening has conceded it for the purpose of the rebuke.
5.6
Ὁ μέν τίς ἐστιν, ὅταν τι δεξιὸν περί τινα πράξῃ, πρόχειρος καὶ λογίσασθαι αὐτῷ τὴν χάριν. ὁ δὲ πρὸς μὲν τοῦτο οὐ πρόχειρος, ἄλλως μέντοι παρ’ ἑαυτῷ ὡς περὶ χρεώστου διανοεῖται καὶ οἶδεν ὃ πεποίηκεν. ὁ δέ τις τρόπον τινὰ οὐδὲ οἶδεν ὃ πεποίηκεν, ἀλλὰ ὅμοιός ἐστιν ἀμπέλῳ βότρυν ἐνεγκούσῃ καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο προσεπιζητούσῃ μετὰ τὸ ἅπαξ τὸν ἴδιον καρπὸν ἐνηνοχέναι.
ἵππος δραμών, κύων ἰχνεύσας, μέλισσα μέλι ποιήσασα, ἄνθρωπος δ’ εὖ ποιήσας οὐκ ἐπιβοᾶται, ἀλλὰ μεταβαίνει ἐφ’ ἕτερον, ὡς ἄμπελος ἐπὶ τὸ πάλιν ἐν τῇ ὥρᾳ τὸν βότρυν ἐνεγκεῖν. ἐν τούτοις οὗν δεῖ εἶναι τοῖς τρόπον τινὰ ἀπαρακολουθήτως αὐτὸ ποιοῦσι.— ναί ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο δεῖ παρακολουθεῖν· ἴδιον γάρ, φησί, τοῦ κοινωνικοῦ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὅτι κοινωνικῶς ἐνεργεῖ, καὶ νὴ Δία βούλεσθαι καὶ τὸν κοινωνὸν αἰσθέσθαι.—ἀληθὲς μέν ἐστιν ὃ λέγεις, τὸ δὲ νῦν λεγόμενον παρεκδέχῃ· διὰ τοῦτο ἔσῃ εἶς ἐκείνων ὦν πρότερον ἐπεμνήσθην· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι λογικῇ τινι πιθανότητι παράγονται. ἐὰν δὲ θελήσῃς συνεῖναι τί ποτέ ἐστι τὸ λεγόμενον, μὴ φοβοῦ, μὴ παρὰ τοῦτο παραλίπῃς τι ἔργον κοινωνικόν.
One person, after doing someone a good turn, is ready to charge the favor to his account. Another is not ready to do that, but inwardly still thinks of the recipient as a debtor and knows what he has done. A third, in a way, does not even know what he has done. He is like a vine that has borne a cluster of grapes and seeks nothing further once it has produced its own fruit.
A horse has run, a dog has tracked, a bee has made honey. A human being who has done good does not shout about it, but goes on to another act, as the vine goes on to bear grapes again in season. So we must be among those who, in a way, do this without attending to it. “Yes, but we must attend to precisely that. It belongs to a social creature,” someone says, “to be aware that it acts socially, and, by Zeus, to want its partner to be aware as well.” What you say is true, but you misunderstand what is being said now. That is why you will be one of those I mentioned earlier: they too are led astray by something that sounds reasonable. But if you are willing to understand what the statement means, do not fear that this will make you neglect any social action.
Commentary
The best benefactor abandons the ledger of repayment without abandoning awareness of social action. The three benefactors differ more subtly than a contrast between generosity and greed. The second asks for no payment but preserves a debtor in his own thought. The third is compared with a fruit-bearing vine, which looks for nothing beyond performing its function. The subsequent horse, dog, and bee extend the pattern of completed activity, while the returning season makes repeated service possible. An interlocutor objects that a social creature should know what it is doing and wish its partner to know as well. The reply grants the truth of that claim but rejects its use to restore the earlier accounting. The qualification that one acts without attending in a certain way is therefore essential: the target is self-crediting calculation, not the intelligence necessary for cooperation.
5.6.1, 5.6.2 The vine analogy does not require a beneficiary to remain ignorant of the favor. The objection explicitly includes the other participant’s awareness, and the answer does not deny its truth. What it denies is that such awareness justifies the misunderstanding already represented by the two debt-conscious agents. Concealment of every kindness would be a stronger instruction than the passage gives. Its concern is whether doing good becomes the basis for claiming an additional return or celebrating one’s own credit.
5.7
Εὐχὴ Ἀθηναίων· ὗσον, ὗσον, ὦ φίλε Ζεῦ, κατὰ τῆς ἀρούρας τῆς Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν πεδίων. ἤτοι οὐ δεῖ εὔχεσθαι ἢ οὕτως ἁπλῶς καὶ ἐλευθέρως.
The Athenians’ prayer: “Rain, rain, dear Zeus, upon the Athenians’ plowland and plains.” Either one should not pray, or one should pray like this, simply and freely.
Commentary
The quoted prayer makes directness and a free manner the criteria of acceptable petition. Rain is requested twice, Zeus is addressed as dear, and the land receiving it is specifically Athenian. The speaker then sets an alternative: either avoid prayer or pray with this simplicity and freedom. The entry does not replace the request with silent acceptance, nor does it promise that the god must grant it. What receives praise is the manner of addressing the god. Its agricultural particularity also matters: the exemplary prayer concerns a shared field of need, even though the sentence does not turn that feature into an explicit universal rule for every request.
5.8
Ὁποῖόν τί ἐστι τὸ λεγόμενον, ὅτι· συνέταξεν ὁ Ἀσκληπιὸς τούτῳ ἱππασίαν ἢ ψυχρολουσίαν ἢ ἀνυποδησίαν, τοιοῦτόν ἐστι καὶ τό· συνέταξε τούτῳ ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις νόσον ἢ πήρωσιν ἢ ἀποβολὴν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ τὸ συνέταξε τοιοῦτόν τι σημαίνει· ἔταξε τούτῳ τοῦτο ὡς κατάλληλον πρὸς ὑγίειαν, καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ συμβαῖνον ἑκάστῳ τέτακταί πως αὐτῷ ⟨ὡς⟩ κατάλληλον πρὸς τὴν εἱμαρμένην.
οὕτως γὰρ καὶ συμβαίνειν αὐτὰ ἡμῖν λέγομεν ὡς καὶ τοὺς τετραγώνους λίθους ἐν τοῖς τείχεσιν ἤ ἐν ταῖς πυραμίσι συμβαίνειν οἱ τεχνῖται λέγουσι, συναρμόζοντας ἀλλήλοις τῇ ποιᾷ συνθέσει. ὅλως γὰρ ἁρμονία ἐστὶ μία καὶ ὥσπερ ἐκ πάντων τῶν σωμάτων ὁ κόσμος τοιοῦτον σῶμα συμπληροῦται, οὕτως ἐκ πάντων τῶν αἰτίων ἡ εἱμαρμένη τοιαύτη αἰτία συμπληροῦται.
νοοῦσι δὲ ὃ λέγω καὶ οἱ τέλεον ἰδιῶται· φασὶ γάρ· τοῦτο ἔφερεν αὐτῷ. οὐκοῦν τοῦτο τούτῳ ἐφέρετο καὶ τοῦτο τούτῳ συνετάττετο· δεχώμεθα οὖν αὐτὰ ὡς ἐκεῖνα ⟨ἃ⟩ ὁ Ἀσκληπιὸς συντάττει. πολλὰ γοῦν καὶ ἐν ἐκείνοις ἐστὶ τραχέα, ἀλλὰ ἀσπαζόμεθα τῇ ἐλπίδι τῆς ὑγιείας.
τοιοῦτόν τί σοι δοκείτω ἄνυσις καὶ συντέλεια τῶν τῇ κοινῇ φύσει δοκούντων, οἷον ἡ σὴ ὑγίεια, καὶ οὕτως ἀσπάζου πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον, κἂν ἀπηνέστερον δοκῇ, διὰ τὸ ἐκεῖ σε ἄγειν, ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ κόσμου ὑγίειαν καὶ τὴν τοῦ Διὸς εὐοδίαν καὶ εὐπραγίαν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν τοῦτό τινι ἔφερεν, εἰ μὴ τῷ ὅλῳ συνέφερεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ τυχοῦσα φύσις φέρει τι, ὃ μὴ τῷ διοικουμένῳ ὑπ’ αὐτῆς κατάλληλόν ἐστιν.
οὐκοῦν κατὰ δύο λόγους στέργειν χρὴ τὸ συμβαῖνόν σοι· καθ’ ἕνα μέν, ὅτι σοὶ ἐγίνετο καὶ σοὶ συνετάττετο καὶ πρὸς σέ πως εἶχεν, ἄνωθεν ἐκ τῶν πρεσβυτάτων αἰτίων συγκλωθόμενον· καθ’ ἕτερον δέ, ὅτι τῷ τὸ ὅλον διοικοῦντι τῆς εὐοδίας καὶ τῆς συντελείας καὶ νὴ Δία τῆς συμμονῆς αὐτῆς καὶ τὸ ἰδίᾳ εἰς ἕκαστον ἧκον αἴτιόν ἐστι. πηροῦται γὰρ τὸ ὁλόκληρον, ἐὰν καὶ ὁτιοῦν διακόψῃς τῆς συναφείας καὶ συνεχείας ὥσπερ τῶν μορίων, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τῶν αἰτίων· διακόπτεις δέ, ὅσον ἐπὶ σοί, ὅταν δυσαρεστῇς, καὶ τρόπον τινὰ ἀναιρεῖς.
As people say, “Asclepius prescribed this man riding, cold baths, or going barefoot,” so too one can say, “The nature of the whole prescribed this man illness, disability, loss, or something of that sort.” In the first case, prescribed means something like this: he appointed it for this man as suited to health. Here too, what happens to each person has in some way been appointed for him as suited to what fate assigns.
We say these things “come together” for us just as builders say squared stones in walls or pyramids “come together” when they fit one another in a particular arrangement. There is one harmony in all things. Just as the cosmos, a body of this kind, is made complete from all bodies, so fate, a cause of this kind, is made complete from all causes.
Even wholly untrained people understand what I mean. They say, “It brought him this.” So this was brought to him, and this was prescribed for him. Let us receive such things as we receive what Asclepius prescribes. Many of those prescriptions are harsh too, but we welcome them in the hope of health.
Let the accomplishment and completion of what common nature decides seem to you something like your own health. Welcome everything that happens in this way, even if it seems rather harsh, because it leads you there: to the health of the cosmos, to Zeus’s successful course and good work. He would not have brought this to anyone if it did not benefit the whole. Even an ordinary nature brings nothing that is unsuited to what it governs.
There are two reasons, then, to love what happens to you. First, it came about for you, was prescribed for you, and stood in some relation to you, spun together from the beginning out of the oldest causes. Second, what comes to each person individually is also a cause of the successful course and completion—and, by Zeus, the very continuance—of what governs the whole. The whole is maimed if you cut off even the smallest part of the connection and continuity, whether of its parts or of its causes. You cut it off, as far as lies with you, when you resent what happens; in a way, you destroy it.
Commentary
The prescription analogy asks the individual to understand a harsh event through its relation to an interconnected causal whole. The first comparison makes illness, disability, and loss sound like prescribed regimens. Its next movement joins the language of an event happening to someone with stones fitting into a structure. Bodies compose the cosmic body; causes compose fate as a total cause. This is more than a claim that misfortune will later benefit its immediate sufferer. The analogy shifts the relevant health from the individual to the cosmos and the work of Zeus. The final section gives two grounds for acceptance: the event belongs to one’s allotted causal history, and it contributes to the completion and continuance of what governs the whole. Resentment is then pictured as severing that continuity. The qualifications on this last image matter, because the emotional refusal is described as a kind of severance so far as the individual is concerned, rather than as literal power to undo universal causation.
5.8.2 The fitting stones make the word for an event’s occurrence carry an argument about coordination. The use of συμβαίνειν for both what befalls a person and stones meeting in a structure lets ordinary language supply a transition. The builders’ arrangement is specific: the stones fit one another in a certain composition. The parallel that follows applies this relation to causes as well as bodies. The wordplay illustrates the asserted cosmic harmony; it does not independently prove that every particular event is beneficial.
5.8.3, 5.8.4, 5.8.5 Cosmic health and individual relief are different terms of the analogy. The prescriptions are admitted to be harsh, and welcoming them is first explained by hope of health. The next section instructs the reader to regard completion of common nature’s purposes as analogous to personal health. That movement should remain visible: the promised object is the whole’s successful functioning, not recovery from every illness or compensation for each loss. In the final image, both the limit on one’s power and the qualification of manner keep resentment from becoming a literal exception to the causal order.
5.9
Μὴ σικχαίνειν μηδὲ ἀπαυδᾶν μηδὲ ἀποδυσπετεῖν, εἰ μὴ καταπυκνοῦταί σοι τὸ ἀπὸ δογμάτων ὀρθῶν ἕκαστα πράσσειν, ἀλλὰ ἐκκρουσθέντα πάλιν ἐπανιέναι καὶ ἀσμενίζειν, εἰ τὰ πλείω ἀνθρωπικώτερα, καὶ φιλεῖν τοῦτο, ἐφ̓ ὃ ἐπανέρχῃ, καὶ μὴ ὡς πρὸς παιδαγωγὸν τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐπανιέναι, ἀλλ’ ὡς οἱ ὀφθαλμιῶντες πρὸς τὸ σπογγάριον καὶ τὸ ᾠόν, ὡς ἄλλος πρὸς κατάπλασμα, ὡς πρὸς καταιόνησιν. οὕτως γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐπιδείξῃ τὸ πειθαρχεῖν τῷ λόγῳ, ἀλλὰ προσαναπαύσῃ αὐτῷ. μέμνησο δὲ ὅτι φιλοσοφία μόνα θέλει ἃ ἡ φύσις σου θέλει· σὺ δὲ ἄλλο ἤθελες οὐ κατὰ φύσιν. τί γὰρ τούτων προσηνέστερον; ἡ γὰρ ἡδονὴ οὐχὶ διὰ τοῦτο σφάλλει; ἀλλὰ θέασαι, εἰ προσηνέστερον μεγαλοψυχία, ἐλευθερία, ἁπλότης, εὐγνωμοσύνη, ὁσιότης, αὐτῆς γὰρ φρονήσεως τί προσηνέστερον, ὅταν τὸ ἄπταιστον καὶ εὔρουν ἐν πᾶσι τῆς παρακολουθητικῆς καὶ ἐπιστημονικῆς δυνάμεως ἐνθυμηθῇς;
Do not be disgusted, give up, or lose heart if you cannot make every action follow right principles without interruption. When you are knocked off course, return. Be content if most of what you do is more human, and love what you return to. Do not return to philosophy as to a schoolmaster, but as people with sore eyes turn to the little sponge and the egg, as another turns to a poultice or a warm application. Then you will not make a display of obeying reason, but find rest in it. Remember that philosophy wants only what your nature wants. You wanted something else, contrary to nature. What is more agreeable than these things? Is it not on this very account that pleasure deceives us? But consider whether greatness of soul, freedom, simplicity, fair judgment, and holiness are more agreeable. What is more agreeable than wisdom itself, when you consider the steadiness and easy flow, in every matter, of the power to attend closely and to know?
Commentary
Return after a lapse is made part of philosophical practice rather than evidence that the practice has failed. Three prohibitions oppose disgust, surrender, and discouragement when right action is not continuous. The next instructions accept improvement in the greater part of conduct and require affection for what one returns to. Philosophy is approached through images of relief for an inflamed or injured body, in contrast with return to a schoolmaster. The turn from duty to attractiveness is then argued through a series of questions: pleasure can deceive because it seems agreeable, but the virtues and the orderly use of understanding can also invite attachment. This supplies a motive for return without claiming that every lapse is trivial or that the desired steadiness is already attained. The selected display reading gives the treatment image an additional contrast between showing obedience and finding rest in reason.
5.9.1 The contrast with displaying obedience follows the printed reading, while the next demonstrative remains open. Leopold prints ἐπιδείξῃ before obedience to reason and records alternatives in the apparatus. This supports the contrast between performing obedience for display and resting in philosophy. A few lines later, the plural demonstrative in the question about agreeableness remains less explicit: the nearby contrast between natural and contrary wishes allows more than one way of hearing it. The English leaves that reference unnamed. The later list of virtues nevertheless makes the sustained comparison of attractions clear.
5.10
Τὰ μὲν πράγματα ἐν τοιαύτῃ τρόπον τινὰ ἐγκαλύψει ἐστίν, ὥστε φιλοσόφοις οὐκ ὀλίγοις οὐδὲ τοῖς τυχοῦσιν ἔδοξε παντάπασιν ἀκατάληπτα εἶναι, πλὴν αὐτοῖς γε τοῖς Στωικοῖς δυσκατάληπτα δοκεῖ· καὶ πᾶσα ἡ ἡμετέρα συγκατάθεσις μεταπτώτη· ποῦ γὰρ ὁ ἀμετάπτωτος; μέτιθι τοίνυν ἐπ’ αὐτὰ τὰ ὑποκείμενα ὡς ὀλιγοχρόνια καὶ εὐτελῆ καὶ δυνάμενα ἐν κτήσει κιναίδου ἢ πόρνης ἢ λῃστοῦ εἶναι. μετὰ τοῦτο ἔπιθι ἐπὶ τὰ τῶν συμβιούντων ἤθη, ὧν μόλις ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ χαριεστάτου ἀνασχέσθαι, ἵνα μὴ λέγω, ὅτι καὶ ἑαυτόν τις μόγις ὑπομένει.
ἐν τοιούτῳ οὖν ζόφῳ καὶ ῥύπῳ καὶ τοσαύτῃ ῥύσει τῆς τε οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ χρόνου καὶ τῆς κινήσεως καὶ τῶν κινουμένων τί ποτέ ἐστι τὸ ἐκτιμηθῆναι ἢ τὸ ὅλως σπουδασθῆναι δυνάμενον, οὐδ’ ἐπινοῶ. τοὐναντίον γὰρ δεῖ παραμυθούμενον ἑαυτὸν περιμένειν τὴν φυσικὴν λύσιν καὶ μὴ ἀσχάλλειν τῇ διατριβῇ, ἀλλὰ τούτοις μόνοις προσαναπαύεσθαι· ἑνὶ μὲν τῷ, ὅτι οὐδὲν συμβήσεταί μοι ὃ οὐχὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὅλων φύσιν ἐστίν· ἑτέρῳ δέ, ὅτι ἔξεστί μοι μηδὲν πράσσειν παρὰ τὸν ἐμὸν θεὸν καὶ δαίμονα· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὁ ἀναγκάσων τοῦτον παραβῆναι.
Things are, in a way, so veiled that quite a few philosophers, and no ordinary ones, have thought them utterly impossible to grasp. Even the Stoics think them hard to grasp. Every assent we give is liable to change—for where is the person who never changes? Turn, then, to the underlying things themselves: how short-lived and cheap they are, and how they can belong to a man who takes the passive sexual role, a prostitute, or a robber. Next, consider the characters of those who live with you. It is hard to put up with even the most agreeable of them—not to mention that a person can scarcely endure himself.
In such darkness and filth, in so great a flow of substance and time, of movement and moving things, I cannot even imagine what could be highly prized or taken seriously at all. On the contrary, one must console oneself and await natural dissolution, without resenting the delay, finding rest in these two things alone: first, that nothing will happen to me which is not according to the nature of the whole; second, that it is in my power to do nothing contrary to my own god and divine guardian within, since no one will force me to transgress against him.
Commentary
The passage’s severe depreciation of objects and company ends in two grounds for patient, responsible endurance. The opening acknowledges the difficulty of knowing things and the changeability of assent, even among philosophers. It then lowers the estimate of possessions by their brief duration and by the people who can own them, using charged social and sexual categories. The gaze finally turns upon the difficulty of tolerating others and oneself. This downward sequence makes the turn in the second section important. The speaker is to await natural dissolution without resentment at the delay, supported by the order of common nature and by the possibility of remaining faithful to the inner god. The passage does not infer from unstable judgments that no action can be rational. It asserts two practical resting points in the midst of its strongest rhetoric of obscurity and distaste.
5.10.1 The sexual term contributes a historical judgment of disrepute rather than a modern identity classification. LSJ records a specific sexual sense for κίναιδος and a broader sense of a lewd man. The translation selects the former through the male passive role without adding an age. In the sentence it joins a prostitute and robber as a possessor whom the speaker expects his argument to discredit. Explaining that function preserves the passage’s historical severity; it does not make its hierarchy a new judgment pronounced by the commentary.
5.11
Πρὸς τί ποτε ἄρα νῦν χρῶμαι τῇ ἐμαυτοῦ ψυχῇ; παρ’ ἕκαστα τοῦτο ἐπανερωτᾶν ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἐξετάζειν τί μοί ἐστι νῦν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ μορίῳ, ὃ δὴ ἡγεμονικὸν καλοῦσι, καὶ τίνος ἄρα νῦν ἔχω ψυχήν; μήτι παιδίου; μήτι μειρακίου; μήτι γυναικαρίου; μήτι τυράννου; μήτι κτήνους; μήτι θηρίου;
What am I using my soul for now? Ask yourself this at every turn. Examine what you now have in the part they call the ruling faculty, and whose soul you now possess. A child’s? A young man’s? A little woman’s? A tyrant’s? A grazing beast’s? A wild beast’s?
Commentary
The sequence of questions tests the present use of the ruling faculty by a deliberately uncomfortable set of likenesses. The repeated present tense asks what the soul is doing now, not what permanent identity it possesses. Childhood, male youth, a disparaging female diminutive, tyranny, and two kinds of animal supply images against which conduct is examined. Their juxtaposition should not be smoothed into a neutral list of psychological types. It carries the speaker’s historical hierarchy and rhetorical contempt, and the animal terms preserve a contrast between domesticated or grazing life and wild aggression. The questions themselves leave the precise fault represented by each likeness unstated. Their common purpose is to interrupt complacent self-description and ask what actually occupies the governing part.
5.12
Ὁποῖά τινά ἐστι τὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκοῦντα ἀγαθά, κἂν ἐντεῦθεν λάβοις. εἰ γάρ τις ἐπινοήσειεν ὑπάρχοντά τινα ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθά, οἷον φρόνησιν, σωφροσύνην, δικαιοσύνην, ἀνδρείαν, οὐκ ἂν ταῦτα προεπινοήσας ἐπακοῦσαι δυνηθείη τό· ʽὑπὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶνʼ, οὐ γὰρ ἐφαρμόσει. τὰ δέ γε τοῖς πολλοῖς φαινόμενα ἀγαθὰ προεπινοήσας τις ἐπακούσεται καὶ ῥᾳδίως δέξεται ὡς οἰκείως ἐπιλεγόμενον τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ κωμικοῦ εἰρημένον. οὕτως καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ φαντάζονται τὴν διαφοράν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τοῦτο μὲν [οὐ] προσέκοπτε καὶ ἀπηξιοῦτο, τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ πλούτου καὶ τῶν πρὸς τρυφὴν ἢ δόξαν εὐκληρημάτων παρεδεχόμεθα ὡς ἱκνουμένως καὶ ἀστείως εἰρημένον. πρόιθι οὖν καὶ ἐρώτα, εἰ τιμητέον καὶ ἀγαθὰ ὑποληπτέον τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὧν προεπινοηθέντων οἰκείως ἂν ἐπιφέροιτο τὸ τὸν κεκτημένον αὐτὰ ὑπὸ τῆς εὐπορίας ʽοὐκ ἔχειν ὅποι χέσῃʼ.
You can grasp the character of what most people call good even from this. If someone conceived certain things as truly good—wisdom, self-control, justice, courage—he could not, with these in mind, accept the further phrase “because of his goods”: it would not fit. But with what most people think good in mind, he will accept it and readily take the comic poet’s words as an apt addition. Even most people conceive the distinction this way. Otherwise the first use would not [not] jar and be rejected, while the use about wealth and the advantages that serve luxury or renown was accepted by us as aptly and wittily put. Go on, then, and ask whether we should honor and judge as good such things that, when they are in mind, we can fittingly add that their owner, through his abundance, “has nowhere to shit.”
Commentary
The comic test exploits the difference between moral good and material goods by asking which can make a vulgar line intelligible. Wisdom, self-control, justice, and courage are introduced as genuine goods. Keeping those in mind makes the comic continuation fail; thinking instead of wealth and advantages used for luxury or fame makes it apt. The final obscenity supplies the joke that the earlier partial quotation has withheld. Its coarseness is part of the argument: an abundance that can be ridiculed as obstructing an ordinary bodily function cannot bear the same evaluative weight as virtue. The popular audience’s ability to recognize the joke is used against its own habit of calling such advantages good. The visibly deleted negative complicates the sentence about recognition, but the surrounding contrast remains recoverable when the deletion is read as such.
5.12.1 The bracketed second negative records a deletion within the argument about which application of the joke jars. Leopold’s page brackets the second οὐ and attributes its deletion to Morus in the apparatus. The English makes that editorial feature visible rather than silently deciding the whole sentence through a new Greek reading. The intended contrast is easiest to follow with the bracketed element omitted: the application to real goods would be rejected, whereas the material application is accepted. Keeping both negatives in view without recognizing the deletion can invert or obscure that relation.
5.13
Ἐξ αἰτιώδους καὶ ὑλικοῦ συνέστηκα, οὐδέτερον δὲ τούτων εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν φθαρήσεται, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ὑπέστη. οὐκοῦν καταταχθήσεται πᾶν μέρος ἐμὸν κατὰ μεταβολὴν εἰς μέρος τι τοῦ κόσμου καὶ πάλιν ἐκεῖνο εἰς ἕτερον μέρος τι τοῦ κόσμου μεταβαλεῖ καὶ ἤδη εἰς ἄπειρον. κατὰ τοιαύτην δὲ μεταβολὴν κἀγὼ ὑπέστην καὶ οἱ ἐμὲ γεννήσαντες καὶ ἐπανιόντι εἰς ἄλλο ἄπειρον. οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει οὕτως φάναι, κἂν κατὰ περιόδους πεπερασμένας ὁ κόσμος διοικῆται.
I am made up of the causal and the material. Neither will be destroyed into nonbeing, just as neither came to exist from nonbeing. Every part of me, then, will be assigned through change to some part of the cosmos; that part will change again into another part of the cosmos, and so on without end. Through such change I too came to exist, and those who generated me, and so back into another infinity. Nothing prevents us from saying this, even if the cosmos is governed in bounded cycles.
Commentary
The dissolution of the speaker is described as redistribution through change rather than disappearance into nothing. The opening distinguishes causal and material constituents, then denies annihilation for either. The future chain of transformations is mirrored by a backward chain through the speaker’s own origin and the people who generated him. The final qualification allows this language of indefinite continuation even if the cosmos has bounded cycles. It therefore prevents the contrast between infinite succession and finite periods from being treated as an immediate contradiction. The passage does not state that the personal arrangement called I survives each transformation. Its consolation depends on the continuing order of parts and changes, whose scope is wider than that arrangement.
5.14
Ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ λογικὴ τέχνη δυνάμεις εἰσὶν ἑαυταῖς ἀρκούμεναι καὶ τοῖς καθ’ ἑαυτὰς ἔργοις. ὁρμῶνται μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας ἀρχῆς, ὁδεύουσι δὲ εἰς τὸ προκείμενον τέλος, καθὸ κατορθώσεις αἱ τοιαῦται πράξεις ὀνομάζονται τὴν ὀρθότητα τῆς ὁδοῦ σημαίνουσαι.
Reason and the rational art are powers content with themselves and their own work. They set out from their own first principle and make their way toward the end before them. That is why such actions are called right accomplishments: the name marks the straightness of the road.
Commentary
Right accomplishment is explained through the course of rational action from its own principle toward its proper end. Reason and rational art are characterized as sufficient for their own work. The sentence immediately gives that sufficiency a shape: a starting point, a route, and an end. Its final explanation of right accomplishments draws out the straightness heard in the term. Read with the later distinction between an obstructed external action and an unobstructed disposition, this does not promise that reason can secure every planned result. The self-sufficiency concerns the rational quality of acting and the route it follows. The passage offers an explanatory play on related words, rather than a historical demonstration of how a technical term first arose.
5.15
Οὐδὲν τούτων ῥητέον ἀνθρώπου, ἃ ἀνθρώπῳ, καθὸ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, οὐκ ἐπιβάλλει. οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπαιτήματα ἀνθρώπου οὐδὲ ἐπαγγέλλεται αὐτὰ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις οὐδὲ τελειότητές εἰσι τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως. οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὸ τέλος ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐστι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ κείμενον οὐδέ γε τὸ συμπληρωτικὸν τοῦ τέλους, τὸ ἀγαθόν. ἐπεὶ εἴ τι τούτων ἦν ἐπιβάλλον τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, οὐκ ἂν τὸ ὑπερφρονεῖν αὐτῶν καὶ κατεξανίστασθαι ἐπιβάλλον ἦν οὐδὲ ἐπαινετὸς ἦν ὁ ἀπροσδεῆ τούτων ἑαυτὸν παρεχόμενος, οὐδ’ ἂν ὁ ἐλαττωτικὸς ἑαυτοῦ ἔν τινι τούτων ἀγαθὸς ἦν, εἴπερ ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἦν. νῦν δ᾽, ὅσῳπερ πλείω τις ἀφαιρῶν ἑαυτοῦ τούτων ἢ τοιούτων ἑτέρων ἢ καὶ ἀφαιρούμενός τι τούτων ἀνέχηται, τοσῷδε μᾶλλον ἀγαθός ἐστιν.
Nothing should be called a human being’s which does not belong to him as a human being. Such things are not required of a human being; human nature does not promise them, and they are not perfections of human nature. The human end, then, does not lie in them, nor does what completes that end: the good. If any of them belonged to a human being in this sense, it would not belong to him to despise them and rise above them. Nor would someone who made himself need none of them be praiseworthy, nor would someone who deprived himself of any of them be good, if these things were goods. As it is, the more a person takes away from himself of these or similar things—or bears having some of them taken away—the better he is.
Commentary
The possibility of praiseworthy relinquishment is used to test whether something belongs to the specifically human good. The opening distinguishes what someone possesses from what belongs to a human being as human. The latter must answer to the end and completion of human nature. A counterfactual then tests the things under discussion: if they were goods in that sense, rising above them, needing none of them, or giving them up could not deserve praise. The conclusion reverses their supposed value by praising the person who can remove them or bear their removal. The unnamed class remains broad. The passage gives a criterion for moral valuation rather than a complete list of possessions or a demand that every material capacity be destroyed. Its stress falls on what deprivation shows about dependence.
5.16
Οἷα ἂν πολλάκις φαντασθῇς, τοιαύτη σοι ἔσται ἡ διάνοια· βάπτεται γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν φαντασιῶν ἡ ψυχή. βάπτε οὐν αὐτὴν τῇ συνεχείᾳ τῶν τοιούτων φαντασιῶν· οἷον, ὅτι ὅπου ζῆν ἐστιν, ἐκεῖ καὶ εὖ ζῆν· ἐν αὐλῇ δὲ ζῆν ἐστιν· ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ εὖ ζῆν ἐν αὐλῇ. καὶ πάλιν, ὅτι οὗπερ ἕνεκεν ἕκαστον κατεσκεύασται, πρὸς τοῦτο φέρεται· πρὸς ὃ φέρεται δέ, ἐν τούτῳ τὸ τέλος αὐτοῦ· ὅπου δὲ τὸ τέλος, ἐκεῖ καὶ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἑκάστου· τὸ ἄρα ἀγαθὸν τοῦ λογικοῦ ζῴου κοινωνία. ὅτι γὰρ πρὸς κοινωνίαν γεγόναμεν, πάλαι δέδεικται· ἢ οὐκ ἦν ἐναργὲς ὅτι τὰ χείρω τῶν κρειττόνων ἕνεκεν, τὰ δὲ κρείττω ἀλλήλων; κρείττω δὲ τῶν μὲν ἀψύχων τὰ ἔμψυχα, τῶν δὲ ἐμψύχων τὰ λογικά.
Your understanding will take the character of the impressions you repeatedly receive. The soul is dyed by its impressions. Dye it, then, with a continuous succession of impressions like these: where one can live, one can also live well. One can live at court; therefore one can also live well at court. Again: everything is drawn toward what it was made for. Where it is drawn, there lies its end; and where its end lies, there lie its benefit and its good. The good of a rational creature, then, is social fellowship. That we were born for fellowship has long been shown. Was it not clear that inferior things exist for superior things, and superior things for one another? Living things are superior to lifeless things, and rational beings to other living things.
Commentary
The dyeing image turns repeated attention into a means of making social purpose available in an unpromising setting. The soul takes color from the impressions it repeatedly entertains. The commands that follow therefore prescribe recurring contents of thought, not a single declaration of belief. The example of life at court uses a compact inference to deny that this setting by itself excludes good living. A second sequence traces a creature’s good through its construction, tendency, and end, then names fellowship as the rational creature’s good. The hierarchy of lifeless, living, and rational beings supports that conclusion through the claim that the superior exist for one another. The court example and cosmic hierarchy do different work: one challenges an excuse rooted in circumstance; the other supplies a social end for the conduct that remains possible there.
5.17
Τὸ τὰ ἀδύνατα διώκειν μανικόν· ἀδύνατον δὲ τὸ τοὺς φαύλους μὴ τοιαῦτά τινα ποιεῖν.
To pursue what is impossible is madness. It is impossible for bad people not to do such things.
Commentary
The maxim attacks an expectation that bad character will never issue in characteristic action. The first clause supplies a general judgment about pursuing impossibility; the second identifies the impossible expectation relevant here. The demonstrative leaves the actions unspecified, so the reader must apply the remark to the occasion rather than treat it as an inventory of offenses. The point is practical anticipation of behavior. It does not say that every person remains permanently incapable of learning: the book also directs rational correction toward another person. Accepting that misconduct occurs can therefore remove futile surprise while leaving a task of response.
5.18
Οὐδὲν οὐδενὶ συμβαίνει ὃ οὐχὶ πέφυκε φέρειν. ἄλλῳ τὰ αὐτὰ συμβαίνει καὶ ἤτοι ἀγνοῶν ὅτι συμβέβηκεν, ἢ ἐπιδεικνύμενος μεγαλοφροσύνην, εὐσταθεῖ καὶ ἀκάκωτος μένει. δεινὸν οὖν ἄγνοιαν καὶ ἀρέσκειαν ἰσχυροτέρας εἶναι φρονήσεως.
Nothing happens to anyone that he is not naturally fitted to bear. The same things happen to another person, and he stands firm and remains unharmed, either because he does not know what has happened or because he is showing off his greatness of mind. It is dreadful, then, if ignorance and the desire to please are stronger than wisdom.
Commentary
The comparison with ignorance and display challenges wisdom to sustain a steadiness that inferior motives sometimes produce. The opening makes a sweeping assertion about natural endurance. Its supporting example considers another person who withstands the same event because he either fails to understand it or performs greatness of mind for an audience. The rebuke is that ignorance and the desire to please should prove stronger than understanding. This is an argument addressed to the speaker’s aspiration to wisdom, not a demonstration that identical events have identical bodily effects on everyone. The language of remaining unharmed belongs to the evaluative comparison. Its force lies in exposing a failure of the professed better resource when even confused or ostentatious responses can keep someone steady.
5.19
Τὰ πράγματα αὐτὰ οὐδ’ ὁπωστιοῦν ψυχῆς ἅπτεται οὐδὲ ἔχει εἴσοδον πρὸς ψυχὴν οὐδὲ τρέψαι οὐδὲ κινῆσαι ψυχὴν δύναται, τρέπει δὲ καὶ κινεῖ αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν μόνη καὶ οἵων ἂν κριμάτων καταξιώσῃ ἑαυτήν, τοιαῦτα ἑαυτῇ ποιεῖ τὰ προσυφεστῶτα.
Things themselves do not touch the soul in any way. They have no entry into it and cannot turn or move it. The soul alone turns and moves itself, and whatever judgments it deems itself worthy of making, it makes the things before it correspond to them for itself.
Commentary
The assertion that things do not move the soul locates their evaluative force in the judgments the soul makes about them. The opening denies external things entry, contact, and the power to turn the soul. The repeated verbs are then assigned to the soul itself. The final reflexive qualification is decisive: the soul makes what is before it correspond to its judgments for itself. It does not say that a thought changes an object’s material composition. The absolute form of the opening is sharper than the account of bodily responsiveness in 5.26, where sensation is allowed to reach thought. Reading the two together distinguishes the felt occurrence from the good-or-evil verdict added to it, while preserving the fact that this short entry leaves the physiological relation unexplained.
5.19.1, 5.26.1 The denial of external entry and the acceptance of sensation address different aspects of experience, though their formulations are not equally qualified. Chapter 19 focuses on judgments and what things become for the soul under them. Chapter 26 instead starts with movements in the flesh and permits their communication to thought through bodily unity. Its prohibition concerns the additional evaluation of good or evil. This provides a basis for reading chapter 19 as an assertion of evaluative agency, rather than sensory isolation. The later passage makes the distinction available; it should not be mistaken for wording already stated in the earlier maxim.
5.20
Καθ’ ἕτερον μὲν λόγον ἡμῖν ἐστιν οἰκειότατον ἄνθρωπος, καθ’ ὅσον εὖ ποιητέον αὐτοὺς καὶ ἀνεκτέον· καθ̓ ὅσον δὲ ἐνίστανταί τινες εἰς τὰ οἰκεῖα ἔργα, ἕν τι τῶν ἀδιαφόρων μοι γίνεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐχ ἧσσον ἢ ἥλιος ἢ ἄνεμος ἢ θηρίον. ὑπὸ τούτων δὲ ἐνέργεια μέν τις ἐμποδισθείη ἄν, ὁρμῆς δὲ καὶ διαθέσεως οὐ γίνεται ἐμπόδια διὰ τὴν ὑπεξαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν περιτροπήν. περιτρέπει γὰρ καὶ μεθίστησι πᾶν τὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας κώλυμα ἡ διάνοια εἰς τὸ προηγούμενον καὶ πρὸ ἔργου γίνεται τὸ τοῦ ἔργου τούτου ἐφεκτικὸν καὶ πρὸ ὁδοῦ τὸ τῆς ὁδοῦ ταύτης ἐνστατικόν.
In one respect a human being is closest to us, insofar as we must do good to people and bear with them. But insofar as some obstruct our proper work, a human being becomes one of the indifferent things for me, no less than the sun, the wind, or a wild beast. These things may obstruct some particular action, but they do not obstruct impulse and disposition, because of reservation and redirection. For the understanding turns and shifts every hindrance to action into what it prefers: what checked this work becomes an aid to work, and what blocked this road becomes an aid to the road.
Commentary
Reservation preserves social agency when another person blocks a particular intended action. The entry begins by distinguishing respects in which one person relates to another. Fellowship requires beneficence and patience; obstruction makes the other person comparable to an external condition with respect to carrying out a particular task. That second classification does not repeal the first duty. The same distinction then moves inside action: an undertaking may be stopped while impulse and disposition are redirected through reservation. The closing work and road images portray the hindrance as material for a different exercise of judgment. They offer no guarantee that the original destination will be reached. What remains available is the rational and social manner of proceeding under the changed conditions.
5.20.1 Treating an obstacle as indifferent leaves the duty to the obstructing person intact. The opening obligation to help and bear with people stands beside the comparison with wind and other hindrances. Reservation allows an intended course to be conditional on circumstances; redirection supplies another course for the understanding. Neither mechanism makes contempt for the person a rational success. The entry’s ethical measure lies in the impulse and disposition one retains, so a plan that fails externally can still become an occasion for patience or another useful act.
5.21
Τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τὸ κράτιστον τίμα· ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ πᾶσι χρώμενον καὶ πάντα διέπον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐν σοὶ τὸ κράτιστον τίμα· ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ ἐκείνῳ ὁμογενές. καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ σοῦ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις χρώμενον τοῦτό ἐστι καὶ ὁ σὸς βίος ὑπὸ τούτου διοικεῖται.
Honor what is strongest in the cosmos: that which uses everything and governs everything. In the same way, honor what is strongest in yourself, for it is of the same kind as that. In your case too, this is what uses the rest, and your life is governed by it.
Commentary
The likeness between cosmic and personal government makes honoring the ruling power a matter of its use of the rest. The strongest element in the cosmos is identified by two activities: using everything and directing everything. The corresponding element in oneself receives honor because it is of the same kind and likewise uses what is subordinate to it. The instruction does not merely recommend obeying the strongest impulse. It identifies strength with governing capacity. Chapter 27 later names mind and reason as the divine guardian, giving a more explicit religious form to a relation this entry leaves comparatively unnamed. Their relation is a useful internal parallel without requiring the two passages to have identical terminology.
5.22
Ὃ τῇ πόλει οὐκ ἔστι βλαβερόν, οὐδὲ τὸν πολίτην βλάπτει. ἐπὶ πάσης τῆς τοῦ βεβλάφθαι φαντασίας τοῦτον ἔπαγε τὸν κανόνα· εἰ ἡ πόλις ὑπὸ τούτου μὴ βλάπτεται, οὐδὲ ἐγὼ βέβλαμμαι· εἰ δὲ ἡ πόλις βλάπτεται, οὐκ ὀργιστέον, ⟨ἀλλὰ δεικτέον⟩ τῷ βλάπτοντι τὴν πόλιν τί τὸ παρορώμενον.
What does not harm the city does not harm the citizen either. Apply this rule to every impression that you have been harmed: if the city is not harmed by this, neither have I been harmed. But if the city is harmed, you must not be angry; you must show the person harming the city what he is overlooking.
Commentary
The civic test of harm ends in rational correction even when harm to the community is conceded. The citizen’s interest is first placed within the city’s: an impression of personal injury is to be checked against the common relation. The second branch of the rule is equally important. If the city is harmed, anger still does not become the instructed response. The agent must show the offender what has been overlooked. This makes the maxim more demanding than either dismissing every injury or transferring resentment to the collective level. The city is not identified here with a particular ruler’s preference or with an institution’s declared interest. The entry requires a judgment about harm followed by an intelligible corrective act.
5.23
Πολλάκις ἐνθυμοῦ τὸ τάχος τῆς παραφορᾶς καὶ ὑπεξαγωγῆς τῶν ὄντων καὶ γινομένων. ἤ τε γὰρ οὐσία οἷον ποταμὸς ἐν διηνεκεῖ ῥύσει καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἐν συνεχέσι μεταβολαῖς καὶ τὰ αἴτια ἐν μυρίαις τροπαῖς καὶ σχεδὸν οὐδὲν ἑστὼς καὶ τὸ πάρεγγυς· τὸ δὲ ἄπειρον τοῦ τε παρῳχηκότος καὶ μέλλοντος ἀχανές, ᾧ πάντα ἐναφανίζεται. πῶς οὖν οὐ μωρὸς ὁ ἐν τούτοις φυσώμενος ἢ σπώμενος ἢ σχετλιάζων ὡς ἔν τινι χρόνῳ καὶ ἐπὶ μακρὸν ἐνοχλήσαντι;
Often consider how quickly existing things and events are swept past and carried away. Substance is like a river in unceasing flow; actions are in constant change, causes in countless turns. Almost nothing stands still, even what is close at hand. The boundless past and future gape open, and everything vanishes into them. How, then, is someone not a fool if amid these things he swells with pride, pulls himself about, or laments as though something were troubling him for a substantial stretch of time?
Commentary
The speed and scale of change are used to unsettle pride and lament, without erasing the different things that change. Substance flows, activities alter, and causes turn through countless forms. The river image belongs to the first of these, after which the passage distinguishes further kinds of instability. The selected reading extends this instability even to what lies immediately at hand before opening the view onto limitless past and future. The concluding question measures the speaker’s agitation against that temporal setting. Its language is compressed, especially where it compares annoyance with a substantial duration. The exercise is one of proportion: it challenges how much permanence a present disturbance is being granted. It does not provide a calculation of how long any particular grief ought to last.
5.24
Μέμνησο τῆς συμπάσης οὐσίας, ἧς ὀλίγιστον μετέχεις, καὶ τοῦ σύμπαντος αἰῶνος, οὗ βραχὺ καὶ ἀκαριαῖόν σοι διάστημα ἀφώρισται, καὶ τῆς εἱμαρμένης, ἧς πόστον εἶ μέρος;
Remember the whole substance, of which you share only the smallest part; the whole of time, of which a brief, momentary interval has been marked off for you; and fate—what tiny part of it are you?
Commentary
The three measures of substance, time, and fate reduce the self’s apparent scale while retaining its participation in each. The speaker shares only a small amount of substance and receives only a brief interval of time. The last term changes the rhythm into a question about one’s portion of fate. These are not three interchangeable metaphors for worthlessness: the repeated relation is that of a part within a much wider whole. In the surrounding book, smallness does not remove the work of a rational creature or the requirement to help. The comparison disciplines an inflated estimate of the self’s extent, while leaving the question of how to use its limited place to the practical entries around it.
5.25
Ἄλλος ἁμαρτάνει τι εἰς ἐμέ; ὄψεται· ἰδίαν ἔχει διάθεσιν, ἰδίαν ἐνέργειαν. ἐγὼ νῦν ἔχω, ὅ με θέλει νῦν ἔχειν ἡ κοινὴ φύσις, καὶ πράσσω, ὅ με νῦν πράσσειν θέλει ἡ ἐμὴ φύσις.
Does someone wrong me? Let him see to it. He has his own disposition and his own action. I now have what common nature wants me to have now, and I do what my own nature wants me to do now.
Commentary
The repeated present tense separates another person’s misconduct from the speaker’s own allotment and action. The wrongdoer is assigned his own disposition and activity. The reply then turns to what the speaker has and does now, repeating the temporal marker three times. Common nature governs the present circumstances; personal nature supplies the direction of response. This pairing avoids the inference that being wronged transfers control over one’s conduct to the wrongdoer. It also does not specify that the fitting response must be inactivity. Within this book, correction and assistance remain available forms of social action. The sentence’s economy lies in returning responsibility to its present location rather than supplying a full remedy for every offense.
5.26
Τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ κυριεῦον τῆς ψυχῆς σου μέρος ἄτρεπτον ἔστω ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ λείας ἢ τραχείας κινήσεως καὶ μὴ συγκρινέσθω, ἀλλὰ περιγραφέτω αὑτὸ καὶ περιοριζέτω τὰς πείσεις ἐκείνας ἐν τοῖς μορίοις. ὄταν δὲ ἀναδιδῶνται κατὰ τὴν ἑτέραν συμπάθειαν εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν ὡς ἐν σώματι ἡνωμένῳ, τότε πρὸς μὲν τὴν αἴσθησιν φυσικὴν οὖσαν οὐ πειρατέον ἀντιβαίνειν, τὴν δὲ ὑπόληψιν τὴν ὡς περὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ κακοῦ μὴ προστιθέτω τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ.
Let the ruling and sovereign part of your soul remain unturned by smooth or rough movement in the flesh. Let it not blend with that movement, but mark out its own boundary and confine those experiences to the bodily parts. Yet when they are passed up into thought through the other kind of mutual responsiveness, as in a unified body, do not try to resist the sensation, since it is natural. Only let the ruling faculty add no judgment of its own that this is good or evil.
Commentary
The ruling faculty is asked to withhold a moral verdict from bodily sensation, while sensation itself is allowed to occur. The opening draws a boundary between the governing part and smooth or rough movements of the flesh. Its language of separation can sound like a demand for complete insulation, but the following qualification allows bodily experiences to be communicated to thought within a unified body. At that point the natural sensation is not to be resisted. The prohibition concerns the faculty’s own addition of a judgment that the experience is good or evil. The order of the clauses matters: boundary, communication, and evaluation are distinguished. The account does not ask the subject to pretend that no pain or pleasure is felt, and it does not identify a pleasant feeling with the good of the agent.
5.26.1 The phrase about the other kind of responsiveness retains a contrast the passage does not fully explain. The adjective ἑτέραν implies a distinction within the communication of experience. The immediate context supplies bodily unity and a movement upward into thought, but it does not explicitly name the alternative to which this kind is opposed. Interpreting the phrase as a fully specified reversal of direction would add more than the sentence states. The uncertainty does not obscure the practical instruction that follows: natural sensation is admitted, while the governing faculty’s added evaluation is restricted.
5.27
ʽΣυζῆν θεοῖς.ʼ συζῇ δὲ θεοῖς ὁ συνεχῶς δεικνὺς αὐτοῖς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ψυχὴν ἀρεσκομένην μὲν τοῖς ἀπονεμομένοις, ποιοῦσαν δὲ ὅσα βούλεται ὁ δαίμων, ὃν ἑκάστῳ προστάτην καὶ ἡγεμόνα ὁ Ζεὺς ἔδωκεν, ἀπόσπασμα ἑαυτοῦ. οὗτος δέ ἐστιν ὁ ἑκάστου νοῦς καὶ λόγος.
“Live with the gods.” A person lives with the gods when he continually shows them his soul content with what is allotted and doing whatever the divine guardian within wills—the guardian whom Zeus gave each person as protector and guide, a portion of himself. This is each person’s mind and reason.
Commentary
Living with the gods combines acceptance of allotment with action governed by the divine portion identified as reason. The short opening expression is immediately expanded into a sustained relation: the soul shows the gods both contentment with what it receives and obedience in what it does. Zeus is named as the giver of the protecting and guiding guardian, which is described as a portion of himself. Only after this religious account does the passage identify the guardian as each person’s mind and reason. The final identification therefore brings the accounts together rather than making the divine language dispensable. It also keeps passive acceptance from standing alone as the whole of ethical life. The soul must act in accordance with the same authority to which it entrusts its allotted circumstances.
5.28
Τῷ γράσωνι μήτι ὀργίζῃ, μήτι τῷ ὀζοστόμῳ ὀργίζῃ; τί σοι ποιήσει; τοιοῦτον στόμα ἔχει, τοιαύτας μάλας ἔχει, ἀνάγκη τοιαύτην ἀποφορὰν ἀπὸ τοιούτων γίνεσθαι. —ἀλλ’ ὁ ἄνθρωπος λόγον ἔχει, φησί, καὶ δύναται συννοεῖν ἐφιστάνων τί πλημμελεῖ.—εὖ σοι γένοιτο· τοιγαροῦν καὶ σὺ λόγον ἔχεις, κίνησον λογικῇ διαθέσει λογικὴν διάθεσιν, δεῖξον, ὑπόμνησον· εἰ γὰρ ἐπαίει, θεραπεύσεις καὶ οὐ χρεία ὀργῆς.
Οὔτε τραγῳδὸς οὔτε πόρνη.
Are you angry with someone whose armpits smell? Are you angry with someone whose breath smells? What can he do for you? He has a mouth like that, armpits like that; such an odor must come from such things. “But the person has reason,” someone says, “and by paying attention he can understand what he is doing wrong.” Good luck to you. You have reason too, then. Move his rational disposition by your own rational disposition. Show him; remind him. If he listens, you will cure him, and there is no need for anger.
Neither a tragic actor nor a prostitute.
Commentary
The reply to anger asks the agent to exercise the same reason he demands from the person who causes offense. Unpleasant bodily odors first illustrate the futility of resenting an effect that follows from a given condition. An objection then introduces rational responsibility: the person could notice what is wrong. The response turns that capacity back on the objector. Having reason oneself means showing and reminding, and cure is expressly conditional on the other person listening. The entry thus passes from tolerating a cause to attempting a rational remedy, rather than using necessity to rule out every change. Its separate final fragment rejects the roles of tragic actor and prostitute, but does not spell out how those two images attach to the preceding argument.
5.28.1 The final pair can suggest avoidance of theatrical grievance and self-abasement, but its brevity prevents a secure paraphrase. The two role nouns are vivid after an exchange about anger and correction. A contrast between magnified indignation and a degrading attempt to please is a plausible reading of their function. Yet no connecting verb or explicit quality assigns those meanings to the roles. The fragment should therefore retain its pressure without becoming a developed theory of theater, sex work, or social flattery. Its literary force is clearer than its exact relation to the preceding example.
5.29
Ὡς ἐξελθὼν ζῆν διανοῇ, οὕτως ἐνταῦθα ζῆν ἔξεστιν· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἐπιτρέπωσι, τότε καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἔξιθι, οὕτως μέντοι ὡς μηδὲν κακὸν πάσχων. καπνὸς καὶ ἀπέρχομαι· τί αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα δοκεῖς; μέχρι δέ με τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν ἐξάγει, μένω ἐλεύθερος καὶ οὐδείς με κωλύσει ποιεῖν ἃ θέλω· θέλω δὲ κατὰ φύσιν τοῦ λογικοῦ καὶ κοινωνικοῦ ζῴου.
You can live here as you intend to live after leaving. If they do not allow it, then leave life too, but as someone suffering no evil. Smoke, and I go away. Why think it such a great matter? Until something like that drives me out, I remain free, and no one will prevent me from doing what I want. What I want is what accords with the nature of a rational and social creature.
Commentary
The passage’s extreme departure clause is framed by the claim that rational and social life can be practiced in the present place. The first leaving has no named destination: a better manner of life imagined elsewhere is said to be possible here. The next conditional escalates to an explicit departure from life if that manner of living is not permitted, with smoke supplying a terse image of an intolerable environment. That historical claim should remain visible without converting it into an immediate instruction. The passage then returns to remaining: until such a condition drives the speaker out, he is free. The final sentence defines the desires at issue by rational and social nature. This restriction is what makes the assertion of unimpeded freedom intelligible; it does not assert that every external intention can be fulfilled.
5.29.1 The passage distinguishes a change of setting, the possibility of leaving life, and the present work of remaining. The first clause need not refer to death, since it describes the life one intends after leaving. The second expressly names life as what would be left. The smoke image compresses the transition but does not identify a concrete political incident or prescribe a procedure. The last movement insists on continuing under the present conditions, with desire governed by the nature of a rational social being. Reading only the middle clause would remove both the opening possibility and the final limitation that frame it.
5.30
Ὁ τοῦ ὅλου νοῦς κοινωνικός. πεποίηκε γοῦν τὰ χείρω τῶν κρειττόνων ἕνεκεν καὶ τὰ κρείττω ἀλλήλοις συνήρμοσεν. ὁρᾷς πῶς ὑπέταξε, συνέταξε, καὶ τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν ἀπένειμεν ἑκάστοις καὶ τὰ κρατιστεύοντα εἰς ὁμόνοιαν ἀλλήλων συνήγαγεν.
The mind of the whole is social. It has made inferior things for the sake of superior things and fitted superior things to one another. You see how it subordinated some, coordinated others, allotted each its share according to worth, and brought the strongest into concord with one another.
Commentary
The order of the whole is called social through coordinated hierarchy and distribution, rather than through uniform rank. The entry distinguishes things made for the sake of others from superior things fitted to one another. Its next sequence presents several operations: subordination, coordination, allotment according to worth, and concord among the strongest. The claim is that these different relations disclose the social character of the governing mind. It does not identify particular offices, classes, or species for every term in the sequence. The language is explicitly hierarchical, while the distributing verb treats worth as the measure of a share rather than the share itself. This matters for the picture of order: each receives in relation to a standard, not an arbitrarily conferred quantity called worth.
5.30.1 Worth measures the allotment; it is not itself what the governing mind distributes. The phrase κατ’ ἀξίαν gives the standard according to which the distribution occurs, and ἑκάστοις marks its recipients. The English makes a general share explicit to complete that relation without choosing a material possession or rank. Reading the sentence as assigning each thing its worth would make a different claim about the origin of value. The surrounding verbs describe arrangements among things and support the distributional reading.
5.31
Πῶς προσενήνεξαι μέχρι νῦν θεοῖς, γονεῦσιν, ἀδελφοῖς, γυναικί, τέκνοις, διδασκάλοις, τροφεῦσι, φίλοις, οἰκείοις, οἰκέταις· εἰ πρὸς πάντας σοι μέχρι νῦν ἐστι τό· μήτε τινὰ ῥέξαι ἐξαίσιον μήτε ⟨τι⟩ εἰπεῖν. ἀναμιμνῄσκου δὲ καὶ δι’ οἵων διελήλυθας καὶ οἷα ἤρκεσας ὑπομεῖναι καὶ ὅτι πλήρης ἤδη σοι ἡ ἱστορία τοῦ βίου καὶ τελεία ἡ λειτουργία καὶ πόσα ὦπται καλὰ καὶ πόσων μὲν ἡδονῶν καὶ πόνων ὑπερεῖδες, πόσα δὲ ἔνδοξα παρεῖδες, εἰς ὅσους δὲ ἀγνώμονας εὐγνώμων ἐγένου.
How have you behaved until now toward gods, parents, brothers, wife, children, teachers, those who raised you, friends, relatives, household slaves? Has this held for you toward everyone until now: “Neither act outrageously toward anyone nor say anything outrageous”? Remember too what you have passed through, what you have had the strength to endure, and that your account of life is already complete and your public service finished. How many noble things you have seen; how many pleasures and pains you have risen above; how many distinctions you have passed by; how many unreasonable people you have treated reasonably.
Commentary
The retrospective examination joins conduct toward particular people to a sense that life and service can already be complete. The initial list tests relations one by one, from gods and family to teachers, rearers, friends, and household slaves. Its range makes the following prohibition of outrageous deed or speech more concrete than a general statement of goodwill. The entry then recalls what the speaker has undergone, endured, seen, relinquished, and met with reasonable conduct. Completion is asserted in the present reflection, not postponed until every possible achievement has been accumulated. That rhetorical sufficiency need not date the entry to a retirement or the end of an office. The retrospective questions are a way of measuring a life by conduct and endurance rather than by an unfinished appetite for distinction.
5.31.1 The people who raised the speaker are a broader category than nurses alone. The Greek list distinguishes teachers from τροφεῖς. LSJ gives the latter a general rearing sense and cites this passage within its tutor usage, while also recording nurse in a narrower application. The English preserves the relation of bringing someone up without identifying each member’s occupation. This maintains the list’s differentiation without adding a second identical category of teachers or restricting rearing to bodily nourishment.
5.32
Διὰ τί συγχέουσιν ἄτεχνοι καὶ ἀμαθεῖς ψυχαὶ ἔντεχνον καὶ ἐπιστήμονα; τίς οὖν ψυχὴ ἔντεχνος καὶ ἐπιστήμων; ἡ εἰδυῖα ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος καὶ τὸν δι’ ὅλης τῆς οὐσίας διήκοντα λόγον καὶ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος κατὰ περιόδους τεταγμένας οἰκονομοῦντα τὸ πᾶν.
Why do untrained and ignorant souls unsettle a trained and knowledgeable soul? What, then, is a trained and knowledgeable soul? One that knows the beginning and the end, and the reason that runs through all substance and governs the whole through all time in ordered cycles.
Commentary
The test of a trained soul asks whether knowledge of the whole changes its response to less trained people. The opening juxtaposes the supposedly knowledgeable soul with those who unsettle it. The question that follows defines the knowledge under discussion by origin, end, and the reason that orders substance through time. This is a demanding link between cosmological understanding and conduct: knowing the whole should alter the scale and meaning given to another person’s disturbance. The entry does not prove that possessing a description of cosmic reason automatically prevents agitation. Its interrogative form challenges the speaker to make professed understanding effective in the encounter before him.
5.33
Ὅσον οὐδέπω σποδὸς ἢ σκελετὸς καὶ ἤτοι ὄνομα ἢ οὐδὲ ὄνομα, τὸ δὲ ὄνομα ψόφος καὶ ἀπήχημα. τὰ δὲ ἐν τῷ βίῳ πολυτίμητα κενὰ καὶ σαπρὰ καὶ μικρὰ καὶ κυνίδια διαδακνόμενα καὶ παιδία φιλόνεικα, γελῶντα, εἶτα εὐθὺς κλαίοντα· πίστις δὲ καὶ αἰδὼς καὶ δίκη καὶ ἀλήθεια πρὸς Ὄλυμπον ἀπὸ χθονὸς εὐρυοδείης. τί οὖν ἔτι τὸ ἐνταῦθα κατέχον, εἴ γε τὰ μὲν αἰσθητὰ εὐμετάβλητα καὶ οὐχ ἑστῶτα, τὰ δὲ αἰσθητήρια ἀμυδρὰ καὶ εὐπαρατύπωτα, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ψυχάριον ἀναθυμίασις ἀφ’ αἵματος, τὸ δὲ εὐδοκιμεῖν παρὰ τοιούτοις κενόν; τί οὖν; περιμένεις ἵλεως τὴν εἴτε σβέσιν εἴτε μετάστασιν· ἕως δὲ ἐκείνης ὁ καιρὸς ἐφίσταται, τί ἀρκεῖ; τί δὲ ἄλλο ἢ θεοὺς μὲν σέβειν καὶ εὐφημεῖν, ἀνθρώπους δὲ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ ἀνέχεσθαι αὐτῶν καὶ ἀπέχεσθαι· ὅσα δὲ ἐντὸς ὅρων τοῦ κρεᾳδίου καὶ τοῦ πνευματίου, ταῦτα μεμνῆσθαι μήτε σὰ ὄντα μήτε ἐπὶ σοί.
Very soon, ashes or a skeleton; a name, or not even a name. And a name is a noise, an echo. The things prized in life are empty, rotten, small: little dogs biting one another, quarrelsome children laughing and then immediately crying. Good faith, shame, justice, and truth have gone “to Olympus from the earth of broad roads.” What, then, still holds you here, if things perceived change easily and do not stand still, the senses are dim and easily misled, the little soul itself is vapor rising from blood, and to be esteemed by such people is empty? What then? Wait serenely for either extinction or a change of place. Until that moment arrives, what is enough? What else but to revere and speak well of the gods, do good to human beings, bear with them, and keep your distance; and to remember that whatever lies within the boundaries of this little flesh and little breath is neither yours nor up to you.
Commentary
The denunciation of life’s prizes returns to duties toward gods and people while leaving two sharp limits unresolved. An abrupt picture of remains and a fading name is followed by contemptuous images of rivalry and instability. The question about what still holds the speaker here might appear to end in rejection of life, but its response is to wait serenely under alternative accounts of death. The remaining activity includes reverence, speech about the gods, beneficence, and endurance of people. The additional instruction to keep distance is difficult to attach with certainty, and the final restriction concerning what lies within flesh and breath is unusually severe. Those difficulties should not be removed by making the entry either a simple program of withdrawal or a seamless restatement of unrestricted inner control. Its practical duties survive the depreciation, while its exact boundaries demand care.
5.33.1 The instruction to keep distance can be attached to people, but its scope is not uniquely fixed. The preceding pronoun explicitly supplies the people one must bear with. Extending it to ἀπέχεσθαι gives the selected English a relation to those same people. The verb can also be heard more generally as abstention or noninterference, without a freshly expressed object. On either reading, beneficence has just been commanded. Distance therefore cannot simply erase every obligation to others. The unresolved point is the kind and scope of restraint, not whether the earlier command is present.
5.33.1 The reading within the bodily bounds is printed in the governing edition, despite a recorded outside alternative. Leopold’s main text has ἐντός, while the apparatus records ἐκτός in P. The distinction materially changes the final claim’s reach. The selected English keeps the inside reading, so the statement denies ownership and control over what falls within the bounds of flesh and breath. The wider book distinguishes governing judgment from bodily experience, which makes a limitation concerning bodily processes intelligible. That parallel does not settle every aspect of the unusual wording or authorize replacing the preposition with its opposite.
5.34
Δύνασαι ἀεὶ εὐροεῖν, εἴ γε καὶ εὐοδεῖν, εἴ γε καὶ ὁδῷ ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ πράσσειν. δύο ταῦτα κοινὰ τῇ τε τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τῇ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ παντὸς λογικοῦ ζῴου ψυχῇ· τὸ μὴ ἐμποδίζεσθαι ὑπ’ ἄλλου καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ δικαικῇ διαθέσει καὶ πράξει ἔχειν τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὴν ὄρεξιν ἀπολήγειν.
You can always have an easy flow of life if you can make your way well, if you can judge and act by a method. These two things are shared by the soul of a god, of a human being, and of every rational creature: not being hindered by another, and having its good in a just disposition and action, with desire coming to an end there.
Commentary
The possibility of an unimpeded good life is tied to just disposition and action, where desire is told to stop. The opening links a good flow of life with traveling well and judging and acting by a method. Its repeated conditions matter: the ease promised is not an unconditional prediction about events. The second movement names two shared properties of rational souls, whether divine or human. Freedom from another’s obstruction stands beside locating the good in a just disposition and deed. Desire terminates there. This pairing supplies the limit that prevents the first property from becoming a claim of unlimited external power. The passage’s flow and road imagery makes the quality of a course central, even when its circumstances cannot be commanded.
5.35
Εἰ μήτε κακία ἐστὶ τοῦτο ἐμὴ μήτε ἐνέργεια κατὰ κακίαν ἐμὴν μήτε τὸ κοινὸν βλάπτεται, τί ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ διαφέρομαι, τίς δὲ βλάβη τοῦ κοινοῦ;
If this is neither my vice nor an action arising from my vice, and the common whole is not harmed, why am I troubled about it? And what harm is there to the common whole?
Commentary
The question about disturbance tests personal wrongdoing alongside a shared good whose scope remains compressed. The conditional first excludes the speaker’s vice and an action arising from it, then adds that the common whole is not harmed. Only under that combination does the speaker ask why he is troubled. The repeated question about harm to the common whole can probe what such harm would be or press the absence of a reason for disturbance. The noun itself does not specify exclusively a civic community or the cosmic totality. Chapter 22 supplies a nearby civic comparison, but importing its whole argument would conceal the compression here. The commentary therefore preserves the conditional and the final question instead of turning them into an unconditional denial that a community can suffer harm.
5.36
Μὴ ὁλοσχερῶς τῇ φαντασίᾳ συναρπάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ βοηθεῖν μὲν κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ κατ’ ἀξίαν, κἂν εἰς τὰ μέσα ἐλαττῶνται, μὴ μέντοι βλάβην αὐτὸ φαντάζεσθαι· κακὸν γὰρ ἔθος. ἀλλ’ ὡς ὁ γέρων ἀπελθὼν τὸν τοῦ θρεπτοῦ ῥόμβον ἀπῄτει, μεμνημένος ὅτι ῥόμβος, οὕτως οὖν καὶ ὧδε. ἐπεί τοι γίνῃ καλῶν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμβόλων. ἄνθρωπε, ἐπελάθου τί ταῦτα ἦν;—ναί· ἀλλὰ τούτοις περισπούδαστα.—διὰ τοῦτ’ οὖν καὶ σὺ μωρὸς γένῃ;
Ἐγενόμην ποτέ, ὁπουδήποτε καταληφθείς, εὔμοιρος ἄνθρωπος· τὸ δὲ εὔμοιρος, ἀγαθὴν μοῖραν σεαυτῷ ἀπονείμας· ἀγαθαὶ δὲ μοῖραι ἀγαθαὶ τροπαὶ ψυχῆς, ἀγαθαὶ ὁρμαί, ἀγαθαὶ πράξεις.
Do not be swept away completely by the impression. Help as far as you can and as much as is deserved, even if people have lost only indifferent things; but do not take this as harm. That is a bad habit. Be like the old man who went off to ask for his young charge’s spinning toy back, remembering that it was a spinning toy. Do the same here. †Since you are calling out from the rostra.† Man, have you forgotten what these things were? “Yes, but these people take them very seriously.” Does that mean you too must become a fool?
Once, wherever I found myself, I was a fortunate man. And “fortunate” means assigning yourself a good lot. Good lots are good turns of the soul, good impulses, good actions.
Commentary
Assistance to others is required even when their loss should not be adopted as a moral injury, and fortune is finally redefined through action. The opening separates being carried away by an impression from helping within one’s ability and according to worth. The old man seeking a young dependent’s toy illustrates participation without forgetting what kind of thing is at stake. The surrounding dialogue then challenges the inference that another person’s intense concern requires matching it. A broken clause about the rostra interrupts the transition and cannot securely establish the scene. The second paragraph changes from that exchange to a past assertion of being fortunate, followed by a definition of good allotment in terms of movements of soul, impulses, and deeds. The ending connects fortune to conduct without making the speaker the author of every circumstance that befalls him.
5.36.1 Moral indifference of the lost object is compatible with a positive obligation to help recover it. The verb for helping is an instruction, qualified by ability and worth, and it explicitly covers losses among the indifferent things. The old man acts on another’s concern while remembering that the object is a toy. That pairing makes the example useful: refusing to share an inflated estimate of the object need not become refusal of the person. The task is to assist with proportion, not to teach detachment by neglecting every material need.
5.36.1 The rotating object and the young dependent are more certain than the toy’s mechanism or the dependent’s exact status. LSJ cites this passage among uses of ῥόμβος for a boy’s toy and distinguishes that object use from the noun’s motion sense. The attempt to recover it also makes an object necessary here, unlike the image of the soul in 2.17.1. The entry for θρεπτός includes a slave raised in the household and an adopted foundling. The present sentence does not resolve that social status. A general spinning toy and young charge preserve what the anecdote needs without supplying a detailed device or biography.
5.36.1 The daggers mark an unrecovered transition, not a secure description of what the speaker was doing at the rostra. Leopold prints the clause found in the pinned Greek and records different repairs in the apparatus. Its initial connective seems to promise a relation to the preceding exhortation, but the retained wording does not yield a secure completed construction. The English keeps an intelligible fragment rather than selecting an accusation, lament, or other reconstructed scene. The surrounding argument about helping and valuation can still be followed. The broken link should not be used as independent evidence for a particular public speech or autobiographical occasion.
5.36.1 The final paragraph preserves a retrospective statement before turning fortune into a definition addressed to oneself. The first-person past verb and the word for once make the opening a recollection or retrospective assertion. The definition that follows changes to a second-person reflexive: a good allotment is assigned to oneself through good turns, impulses, and actions. This can renew the practical relevance of the remembered condition without silently making the opening a timeless present claim. The catalogue also answers the book’s recurring question about one’s share of fate by distinguishing assigned circumstances from the quality of the soul’s activity.